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RECENT DECISIONS
purposes of this case, the fundamental point is that the proceeding
was not a criminal one. The state was not seeking to punish a
malefactor, it was seeking to salvage a boy who was in danger of
becoming one. In other words, the problem for determination by
the judge is not--"Has this boy committed a specific wrong?"
but "What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best
be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him
from a downward career?" 6 As Statute 7 declares the act com-
mitted by the boy was not a crime, there was no need to warn-
him of self-incrimination at the time he made his confession and
the confession is binding evidence.
J. J. L.
LIABILITY OF SHERIFF FOR WRONGFULLY DISCHARGING
PRISONER COMMITTED FOR CONTEMPT-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-
One Joseph S. Alberti, an executor, was adjudged in contempt of
court for wrongfully neglecting to make certain payments under
his mother's will as directed by the surrogate. These payments
exceeded $16,000, some $6,000 of which were due plaintiffs. Pur-
.suant to the contempt order, a warrant was issued in the usual
form, relating the sums due, the persons to whom owed, and that
commitment was to last until payments were made. Six months
after Alberti's arrest, the sheriff, defendant in this action, released
him without getting the required money. Held, sheriff liable to
plaintiffs to the extent of their damage, namely the $6,000 with
interest. Bijou et al. v. Jacoby et al., 260 N. Y. 289, 183 N. E. 428
(1932).
The Judiciary Law 1 provides that if actual loss is produced
by reason of misconduct of a person adjudged guilty of contempt
of court, "a fine sufficient to indemnify the aggrieved party must
be imposed upon the offender, collected, and paid over to the ag-
grieved party under direction of the court." Thus, once miscon-
duct has been established (as in the instant case by the surrogate),
the only question remaining is the determination of the amount due
in terms of the fine.2  This must be the actual damage suffered,3
as shown from the extent of the impairment or prejudice caused, 4
'Mack, The Juvenile Court (1909) 23 HARv. L. REv. 104.
'Supra note 1.
'N. Y. JuDIcIARY LAW (1909) §773.
' Brill v. Brill, 148 App. Div. 63, 131 N. Y. Supp. 1030 (1st Dept. 1911).
'Supra note 1; Bernstein v. McCahill, 56 Misc.. 460, 107 N. Y. Supp. 161(1907).
'People v. Reid, 139 App. Div. 551, 124 N. Y. Supp. 205 (1st Dept. 1910).
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providing that the latter are the proximate cause of the injury.5
If there is no measurable loss, only. $250 may be collected.0 If on
the other hand, the amount is a definite and provable sum, it is im-
mediately translated into the fine.7
The court may confine the punishment of the offender to simply
this fine," or it may go one step further and order an arrest, as in
the instant case. If the court decides upon arrest and the miscon-
duct consisted of an omission to perform an act or duty "which it
is yet in the power of the offender to perform, he shall be imprisoned
only until he has performed it and paid the fine imposed." 9 In
such a case the warrant of commitment must state the act or duty
to be performed, and the sum to be paid, or else the prisoner may
be released after a reasonable time, not exceeding six months.10
Therefore, it becomes very important that the warrant be patently
explicit, if there is to be an extended jail term. The mere refer-
ence in the warrant to the prior contempt judgment would be in-
sufficient to hold the offender indefinitely," however, any informa-
tion clear enough to enable the committing officer to know, upon a
reading of the warrant, the reason for the arrest and the penalty
imposed will be deemed sufficient.12
The committing officer in such a case would be, of course, the
sheriff, and it is he who must determine the length of time to keep
the offender. Should his determination be erroneous, he will have
to answer under the Correction Law,' 3 which provides that, "a
sheriff or keeper of a jail, who suffers such a prisoner to go or be
at large out of his jail, * * *, is liable to the party aggrieved for
his damages sustained therefor, and is guilty of a misdemeanor."
And further, "if the commitment was for the non-payment of a
sum of money, the amount thereof with interest is the measure of
damages." The party aggrieved in such an instance would be the
complainant who had secured the contempt order originally,14 and
the amount of damage the same as the fine imposed by the contempt
order. Neither insolvency,' 5 nor inability to pay due to prior mis-
Clark v. Bininger, 75 N. Y .344 (1878); Moffat v. Herman, 116 N. Y.
131, 22 N. E. 287 (1889); Socialistic Co-op. Pub. Assn. v. Kuhn, 164 N. Y.
473, 58 N. E. 649 (1900).
'Supra note 1; Matter of Becker, 72 Misc. 157, 129 N. Y. Supp. 614
(1911); Matter pf Schwartz, 85 Misc. 55, 146 N. Y. Supp. 1068 (1914);
Amendola v. Zema, 93 Misc. 525, 157 N. Y. Supp. 273 (1916).
'Supra note 5.
'Hommel v. Buttling, 46 App. Div. 206, 61 N. Y. Supp. 811 (2d Dept.
1899).
'Supra note 1, §774, amended by Laws of 1919, c. 184.10 Ibid.
People v. Grant, 50 Hun 243, 3 N. Y. Supp. 142 (1888).
Instant case.
"N. Y. CoRaRcTioN LAW (1909) §514.
"Matter of Ball, 94 Misc. 112, 158 N. Y. Supp. 1095 (1916).
Dunford v. Weaver, 84 N. Y. 445 (1881).
RECENT DECISIONS
conduct' 0 would excuse the sheriff for a wrongful release. Only
the court has the right to change or modify the terms of the order.
17
In the case at hand, inasmuch as the warrant indicated the
reason for the arrest, the sheriff was duty bound to keep Alberti
within his custody until the fine imposed was paid. Since he did
not so do, he rendered himself liable to the plaintiffs. The wisdom
of strict compliance with the law in this case cannot be doubted.
Any divergence from such a policy would promote' laxity among
public officers and tend to make the mandates of the court a nullity.
F. S. H.
NEGLIGENCE-ATTRACTIVE NUISANcES--LIABILITY TO MINOR.
-The Holland Furnace Co. and its servant were sued by the plain-
tiff, a minor of tender years, for personal injuries sustained by
him due to the alleged negligence of defendant in permitting its
servant to abandon an old automobile, previously used by him, to
remain on property used jointly by defendant and other tenants
of the same landlord. Plaintiff was invited to play by the son of
a tenant. One of the children had taken the cap off the tank,
which contained some gasoline. While playing near the automobile,
plaintiff picked up two stones and struck them together. A spark
entered the tank; an explosion occurred and plaintiff was severely
burned. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff was appealed to the
Court of Appeals, held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover.
Parnell v. Holland Furnace Co., 260 N. Y. 604, 184 N. E. 112
(1932), aff'g 234 App. Div. 567, 256 N. Y. Supp. 199 (4th Dept.
1932).
The theory of attractive nuisances has not been favored by
courts in New York.' It is settled that where the defendant is the
owner of the land he will not be held liable.2 However, where
'People v. Antony, 7 App. Div. 132, 40 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1st Dept. 1896),
aff'd, 151 N. Y. 620, 45 N: E. 1133 (1896).
'
7 Supra note 1, §775.
"Walsh v. Fitchburgh Ry. Co., 145 N. Y. 301, 39 N. E. 1068 (1895);
Mendelowitz v. Neisner, 258 N. Y. 181, 179 N. E. 378 (1932); Flaherty v.
Metro Stations, Inc., 202 App. Div. 583, 196 N. Y. Supp. 2 (4th Dept. 1922),
aff'd, 235 N. Y. 605, 139 N. E. 753 (1923) ; Jaffy v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.,
118 Misc. 147, 192 N. Y. Supp. 852 (1922); Smith, Liability of Land-
ownzer to Children Entering Without Permission (1898) 11 HARv. L. REv.
349, 434.
'Murphy v. City of Brooklyn, 98 N. Y. 642 (1885); Lamore v. Crown
Point Iron Co., 101 N. Y. 391, 4 N. E. 195 (1886); Walsh v. Fitchburgh Ry.
Co., supra note 1; Johnson v. City of N. Y., 208 N. Y. 77, 101 N. E. 691
(1913); Flaherty v. Metro Stations, Inc., supra note 1; Beickert v. G. M.
Laboratories, 242 N. Y. 168, 151 N. E. 195 (1926); Mendelowitz v. Neisner,
supra note 1; De Biase v. Ewart & Lake, Inc., 228 App. Div. 407, 240 N. Y.
Supp. 132 (4th Dept. 1930).
